Distribution, Competition, and Antitrust / IP Law

Patent Tying: Does Price Discrimination Promote Innovation? (Part 2)

In the last post on this topic, I summarized arguments in favor of metered patent tying, as developed in a recent article by Christopher Leslie. There are, of course, arguments against the practice. Leslie summarizes them as follows:

1. The patentee is already rewarded for innovation. The patentee already has the power to charge higher prices for the patented product.

2. Metered tying isn’t calibrated to produce the optimal reward. For most of the 20th century, metered tying constituted (per se) patent misuse, yet firms innovated. The evidence that metered tying is necessary to promote innovation is lacking.

3. Overinvestment. Patent grants produce a “winner-takes-all” reward, which may cause an R&D race by a number of firms. This excessive research activity may be inefficient. Metered tying may exacerbate the problem.

4. Metered tying may not foster innovation. There is an absence of empirical evidence on this point. Additionally, the innovation argument, even if true, has no limiting principle. Why couldn’t companies defend a price-fixing charge on the basis that their activity fostered innovation?

5. Metered tying may reduce innovation in the tied product market. Fewer firms may mean less innovation. A smaller available tied product market provides less incentive for competitors to innovate in that market. The patentee may not have robust incentives to innovate in the tied product market, either. Finally, the tie could force rivals to enter two markets concurrently, impeding competition and innovation.

I’ll finish some thoughts on this in a final post.

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About Howard Ullman

Antitrust, competition, and IP law enthusiast.


  1. […] R&D incentives in the context of patent tying and price discrimination, see my prior posts here and here.  My concluding thoughts on this issue are […]

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