Distribution, Competition, and Antitrust / IP Law

Are Mutual Index Funds Anti-Competitive?

They may be, according to a thought-provoking article by Harvard Law School Professor Einer Elhauge entitled “Horizontal Shareholding as an Antitrust Violation” (July 21, 2015), available here.

In a nutshell, Professor Elhauge’s argument is:

  • Large institutional investors (mutual funds and, presumably, ETFs) own fairly large shareholdings in horizontal competitors throughout the economy – for example, from 2013-15, seven shareholders controlled 60% of United Airlines, 27.5% of Delta airlines, 22.3% of Southwest Airlines, and 20.7% of JetBlue Airlines. The problem is particularly acute for index funds, which routinely invest in horizontal competitors in an industry;
  • Basic economic theory suggests that this sort of “horizontal shareholding” may result in diminished incentives to compete – because if firm A gains profit/market share by lowering prices, shareholders who own stock in both firm A and competitor B (or competitors B and C, or B and C and D, etc.) will see at least some loss in profitability in their other holdings;
  • Recent econometric studies suggest that in markets where shareholdings are concentrated in this manner, higher prices are not only observed, but are also attributable to the “excess” concentration;
  • These horizontal shareholdings explain some persistent economic puzzles, including (a) executive compensation being based on industry performance, rather than corporate performance, (b) the failure of high corporate profits to lead to high growth, and (c) the recent rise in economic inequality; (*)
  • Antitrust law – as it is currently formulated – can reach these horizontal shareholdings under Clayton Act Section 7, and the passive investor exception is not a bar to legal action, because (a) funds actively insert themselves into management discussions and so are not purely “passive” and (b) even if they are, the passive exception does not apply if the acquired stock is actually used (by voting or otherwise) to lessen competition substantially or to attempt to do so; and
  • Regardless of the Section 7 passive investor exception, Sherman Act Section 1 and FTC Act Section 5 apply to horizontal shareholding acquisitions.

As I said, provocative and intriguing stuff. But I have some questions.

  • Mutual fundsandETFs are owned (I assume predominantly) by individuals. Many (most?) of those individuals are also employees in the labor markets. Why would those owners want to see unduly high executive compensation, lower growth, or higher income inequality? If the answer is there is an information gap or asymmetry, why does it persist? If firms subject to fund ownership can figure out (even without communication) that they shouldn’t vigorously compete due to their common owners, why can’t mutual/ETF fund managers figure out that fund owners don’t want fund managers tocontribute to anticompetitive behavior?
    • Perhaps most stock is ultimately held by investors who benefit more in their role as investors than they do as workers.  Additionally, perhaps there is a collective action problem at the fund investor level – even though we would all be better off with a stronger economy, when choosing to invest money, we each have incentives to pick the fund with the highest rate of return.
  • All things being equal, the higher level of horizontal holdings, the moremonopoly-level profits one would expect to be extracted. Yet we apparently see horizontal shareholdings by funds in the 4-6% range (and in any event usually under 10% for any particular fund). If the horizontal ownership strategy were so successful, wouldn’t we expect to see even higher ownership levels? What does it mean that we don’t?
    • Perhaps regulatory obligations kick in at 5% and 10%, and over 15% may require a Hart-Scott-Rodino filing. If there’s no current appetite to bring enforcement actions in this space, however, I wouldn’t think these modest expansion barriers (filing requirements) would be much of an impediment to larger holdings.
    • Perhaps it would be just as profitable to have 5% stakes in four anticompetitive marketsrather than a 20% stake in one anticompetitive market. But:
      • If 4×5% is just as profitable as one 20% holding, doesn’t that suggest that 20×1% is also just as profitable? But we apparently don’t typically see 20×1%, and if we did, it’s not clear to me it would be objectionable. It seems to me that, if the horizontal shareholdings theory is generally correct, one would expect to see higher rates of return (and more anticompetitive effects) with higher levels of shareholding (though the effect may not be linear). So I still wonder about the relatively low levels here.
      • Also, it may be more difficult and expensive to amass and manage a portfolio of many small holdings as opposed to one larger one. Again, if that’s true, how do we explain the absence of larger horizontal shareholdings?
    • Is there anything in securities law and regulation that allows for horizontal ownership and/or communication with management and that would otherwise preempt the application of antitrust law?
    • Would antitrust enforcement lessen fund diversification? And if so, can the pro-competitive effects of antitrust enforcement be balanced against the reduction in diversification in a quantitative manner?
    • To the extent there is an issue, can it be solved by giving funds a choice – either limit their holdings, or agree not to become actively involved in firm management or governance? The article suggests the answer may be yes – “if index funds alone would create a problem of anticompetitive horizontal shareholding in a concentrated market, and those index funds feel the benefits of diversification across all firms in that market exceed the benefits of influencing corporate governance, they could commit not to communicate with management or vote their shares.”

In short – it’s a very interesting theory. But it’s early days, and I think we need some more consideration – and evidence – to evaluate it.

P.S. – The paper also argues that increased antitrust enforcement in the 1930s under Thurman Arnold was a substantial reason for the United States’ emergence from the Great Depression. Certainly the timing of AAG Arnold’s appointment lines up neatly with the decrease in the unemployment rate. As they say, correlation is not causation – but again it’s a very interesting point.

(*) The basic arguments are that (a) the use of industry performance measures is not a bug but a feature for institutional investors who are invested across the industry, because managers who increase individual corporate performance by competing with rivals decrease institutional investor profits across the industry by decreasing industry profits; (b) with horizontal shareholdings, firms acting in the interests of their shareholders have incentives to constrain output rather than expand; and (c) anticompetitive markets raise returns on capital (which is invested in firms whose product prices are inflated) but also lower the effective returns to labor through (i) higher product prices that lower the purchasing power of wages and (ii) the exercise of monopsony power over labor rates.

Milk expiration dates and clever cartels

A glass of milk Français : Un verre de lait

(Photo credit: Wikipedia)

The Planet Money podcast this week has a story about the Greek economy.  According to the podcast, there is a Greek milk producer “cartel.”  Of course cartels are unlawful in Europe, just as they are in the U.S.  So it seems that Greek milk producers have engineered a clever “cartel” — they have lobbied the Greek government to require that bottled milk have an expiration date no more than 7 days after the milk is obtained from the cow.  As a result, milk produced elsewhere in Europe either isn’t available in Greece or is (I assume) more difficult and more expensive to obtain.

The story is an interesting one, and caused me to pause for a moment about the use of the word “cartel.”  In the U.S., this sort of lobbying would almost certainly be protected by the Noerr-Pennington petitioning immunity.  But what if the milk producers got together and agreed on expiration date rules without obtaining a regulation?

Such an agreement might be a form of a “cartel.”  But it wouldn’t be focused on price — at least not directly.  So it probably wouldn’t be subject to the per se rule.  But I think there’s not much reason to worry about such “cartels,” because they wouldn’t work.  Such a milk “cartel” wouldn’t stop manufacturers outside of Greece from exporting milk to Greece (indeed, it might make longer-shelf-life milk produced outside Greece more attractive to Greek consumers), so Greek manufacturers have little or no incentive to form one.  Only the force of government regulation interferes with distribution of non-Greek milk in Greece.

Price Erosion and Restricting Online Distribution Rights

English: Vegetables reseller at rue Mouffetard...

An early vegetables reseller. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

A reader who works with clients who sell online asked me to address online distribution restrictions.  This is more-or-less the reverse of the question I addressed in “Can My Supplier Refuse to Sell Products to Me?”  As always, I offer general thoughts here, not specific legal advice.

First, to frame the issue a bit further – if you sell products online, particularly through third-party sites such as Amazon, eBay, etc., then you very well may have concerns about controlling not only product quality and service but also price.  Many online sellers are seeing price erosion caused by multiple distributors or resellers, and they want to know what they can do about it.

Before getting to the several possibilities below, keep in mind that if you – or anyone in your distribution chain – is a monopolist or near-monopolist, many of these possibilities may be problematic.  It’s often more difficult than you might think to figure out if a firm is a monopolist, but you can use market share as a sort of rough proxy.  A share above 40% starts putting you in the potential yellow zone.  A share above 60%-70% is often (though not always) evidence of monopoly power.

But let’s assume that neither you, nor your supplier (to the extent you have one), has a market share close to these levels.  In that case, what can you do to control product distribution – and particularly product pricing – on third-party Internet sites?

Exclusive distribution

First, you can be appointed (or appoint yourself) as the exclusive distributor of the product.  You can define the rights as they best work for your business.  You could have the exclusive rights to:

  • Distribute product anywhere;
  • Distribute product online; or
  • Distribute product on certain third-party sites (like Amazon).

By having exclusive distribution rights, you can of course maintain better control over product pricing.  (Note – I’m not talking here about actual price agreements – only the natural result of having a limited distribution network.)

Online distribution “territories”

You can appoint distributors, sub-distributors, or resellers for limited purposes – for example, you can have a single authorized sub-distributor for Amazon, another for eBay, etc.  Again, by limiting your distributors, you should see less intra-brand price competition.  Because the antitrust laws are designed to encourage inter-brand competition, a loss of intra-brand competition is not usually a matter of significant (or indeed any) concern.

Minimum advertised price programs

If you use a number of sub-distributors, or if you are one of many sub-distributors, you can use minimum advertised price (“MAP”) programs.  These do not limit actual consumer pricing (e.g., the pricing in an online checkout cart), but they impose limits on what prices can be advertised.  Sometimes advertising coop dollars are awarded for compliance with the program and withheld for non-compliance.  It is important to properly structure any MAP program.  If structured properly, they are lawful throughout the country.

Resale price agreements

This one is a little tricky.  Under federal law, agreements on resale prices are no longer per se unlawful.  They can still be condemned if they are anti-competitive, but it is usually quite difficult to establish that they are.

The problem is that at least several states still consider agreements on minimum resale prices to be per se unlawful.  So before entering into such agreements, you need to consider whether you are going to be selling or distributing products in those states.  If you’re selling on a national platform like Amazon, you may have to assume that you will be selling in all 50 states.

Price discrimination

Can you offer (or be offered) different (e.g., better) pricing than other distributors or sub-distributors?  Maybe, maybe not — there is a complex law called the Robinson-Patman Act that governs such price “discrimination.”  The law makes discrimination unlawful, but there are many exceptions, and I don’t have space to get into all of them here.

Terminations for price

If your sub-distributor is pricing product in a way you don’t like, you can always terminate him/her (putting aside any contract rights he may have).  However, it is very important that you make a clean termination – promises, commitments, and suggestions followed by a reinstatement can amount to an agreement, which again may still be per se unlawful in several states.

Conclusion

There are a number of options for limiting online distribution to maintain better control over product placement and pricing.  Keep in mind, however, that you should never agree on such options with your competitors – or else you may have a horizontal agreement on pricing, which can be extremely problematic.

“And the Plaintiffs Don’t Have to Sue My Competitors Because? . . . .”

One of the pet peeves of antitrust defendants is that the joint-and-several liability rule often means that plaintiffs can pick and choose which defendants to sue. (Plaintiffs will say – that’s a design feature of the antitrust laws, and not a bug.) In Ward v. Apple, Inc., the Northern District of California made it harder for plaintiffs to do the picking and choosing. Yesterday, the Ninth Circuit pushed the pendulum back, making it more difficult for defendants to argue that the picking and choosing is problematic.

In a nutshell, the plaintiffs (a putative class of consumers) alleged that Apple conspired with AT&T Mobility (ATTM) to violate the antitrust laws in connection with Apple’s agreement with ATTM that ATTM would be the exclusive provider of voice and data services for the iPhone. According to plaintiffs, the exclusivity agreement enabled ATTM to charge supra-competitive prices for wireless services; Apple allegedly shared in ATTM’s revenues. Simplifying here a complex procedural history, the plaintiffs eventually brought suit against Apple only. Despite the general rule that plaintiffs can pick the tortfeasors they want to sue, the district court held that ATTM was a “necessary party” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19.

The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. It held that an absent (alleged) antitrust co-conspirator can, under certain circumstances, be a required party under Rule 19 – at least where the absent party has “legally protected” interests to defend. However, it set the bar fairly high. In particular, the court rejected:

  • Apple’s argument that ATTM’s possible increased regulatory scrutiny gives ATTM a legally protected interest (though the court did not decide whether such scrutiny could ever constitute a sufficient interest);
  • The argument that reputational interests can make a party a required party under Rule 19; and
  • The argument that ATTM’s particular contract rights amounted to legally protected interests.

In short, it is once again harder – though not impossible – to argue that all alleged co-conspirators must be joined as defendants in an antitrust suit.

SCOTUS Reaffirms that in Antitrust Cases, It Gives Less Deference to Precedent

Spiderman-exclusive-rooftop

(Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Yesterday, in Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the rule first announced in Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964), that a patentee cannot collect royalties on sales made after expiration of the patent.

The patent law decision upholds a probably anticompetitive rule that from an economic perspective makes little sense. That said, the decision is not particularly surprising, resting as it does on stare decisis (settled law) grounds – though it is amusingly chock-full of references to Spiderman (Marvel Entertainment had licensed a Spiderman product from the plaintiff-patentee, who had a patent on a toy that lets children shoot “webs” from a device held in the palm of the hand). Somewhat disappointingly, the decision does not expressly address an important issue – whether, when a patent portfolio is licensed, license fees must decrease as patents expire.

Perhaps the most important portion of the decision is the following discussion of stare decisis and antitrust law:

If Brulotte were an antitrust rather than a patent case, we might [address the issues] as Kimble would like. This Court has viewed stare decisis as having less-than-usual force in cases involving the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Khan, 522 U. S., at 20–21. Congress, we have explained, intended that law’s reference to “restraint of trade” to have “changing content,” and authorized courts to oversee the term’s “dynamic potential.” Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U. S. 717, 731–732 (1988). We have therefore felt relatively free to revise our legal analysis as economic understanding evolves and (just as Kimble notes) to reverse antitrust precedents that misperceived a practice’s competitive consequences. See Leegin, 551 U. S., at 899–900. Moreover, because the question in those cases was whether the challenged activity restrained trade, the Court’s rulings necessarily turned on its understanding of economics. See Business Electronics Corp., 485 U. S., at 731. Accordingly, to overturn the decisions in light of sounder economic reasoning was to take them “on [their] own terms.” Halliburton, 573 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9).

This is a strong reaffirmation of the Court’s ability to reshape antitrust law according to economic principles and new economic understandings – despite the traditional rule of stare decisis. In other words, for stare decisis principles, some animals really are more equal than others.

Update (06/26/15): I was quoted in Law360 about this (may be behind a paywall).

Is Antitrust Relevant for Startups, Emerging, and Non-Dominant Firms?

The answer is (surprise!) “yes.”

There are a number of ways in which antitrust law is relevant to emerging and non-dominant companies. Those firms may:

  • Need to deal with the dominant firms in their markets, including by (i) responding to threats or actions by dominant firms to foreclose access to products, services or markets, or (ii) negotiating to acquire or maintain access to needed IP;
  • Need access to standard-essential patents (“SEPs”) and to understand their rights to and under FRAND licenses;
  • Want to exploit and license their own IP and put restrictions on its use without triggering antitrust issues;
  • Want to collaborate with other firms – including (dominant) competitors – in producing products or delivering services (i.e., entering into joint ventures);
  • Want to merge with, acquire, or be acquired by another firm, including a dominant one;
  • Want to impose vertical price or non-price restraints, or offer different customers, dealers or distributors different prices; or
  • Need to respond to a government merger or conduct investigation as a third party.

All of the above issues (and more) require the consideration of antitrust law. This is not to say that, for example, every complaint by an emerging firm against a dominant firm is the nucleus of a valid antitrust claim. There are many considerations – including whether there is harm to competition, whether a party has antitrust standing, and the like – and often there is no claim, just the rough-and-tumble of normal business competition. But it’s always helpful to understand the legal landscape, and to consider whether Congress and the courts have struck the appropriate balance between robust competition and truly exclusionary conduct. And on the defensive end, it’s always a good idea to understand how far you can push restraints.

Wholesale Grocery Products Case Raises Questions About How and When to Apply Per Se Rule and Rule of Reason

SHOPPING FOR GROCERIES IN A WASHINGTON, DISTRI...

(Photo credit: Wikipedia)

The Supreme Court today denied review in In re: Wholesale Grocery Products Antitrust Litigation, an action that came up from the District of Minnesota and the Eighth Circuit. Substantively, the case is a useful reminder about the potential dangers of non-compete agreements; procedurally, it raises some troubling questions for future Sherman Act cases.

In brief, two large grocery wholesalers entered into an asset purchase agreement. The New England wholesaler (which did some limited business in the Midwest) acquired the Midwest’s wholesaler’s New England assets. The New England wholesaler – which had acquired the assets of a bankrupt wholesaler’s nationwide assets – also agreed to designate the Midwestern wholesaler as the receiver of the bankrupt firm’s Midwestern assets. As part of the agreement, each wholesaler agreed not to supply the customers of the business it sold for two years and not to solicit those customers for five years. The written terms did not include any express restrictions as to the solicitation or supply of other customers or any geographic market division.

The plaintiff – a small “mom and pop” grocery store – alleged that the non-compete agreement was unlawful, and that it went beyond the written terms of the contract to include not only former customers, but also new and existing customers. The district court granted summary judgment to the wholesalers, but the Eighth Circuit reversed.

On the substance of the issue, the outcome may not be terribly surprising: if there were evidence of a non-compete as to new and existing customers, that evidence might support a judgment that the agreement was an anti-competitive and unlawful market or customer division – at least under the Rule of Reason – although many ancillary non-competes have been found to be perfectly lawful.(*)

The procedural issue is perhaps the more interesting one. The Eighth Circuit held that because there were material issues of fact as to what the wholesalers actually agreed to do, the district court could not resolve on summary judgment the question of whether to apply the per se rule or the Rule of Reason. (Other circuits have concluded that where there are fact issues regarding the exact nature or effects of the restraint, per se treatment is inappropriate.) And so, as the wholesalers told the Supreme Court in their cert. brief, “[t]he holding below creates a twilight zone in which litigants ‘d[o]n’t know what kind of trial to prepare for . . . . A per se trial looks vastly different than a rule-of-reason trial.” “Equally troubling,” the wholesalers wrote, “plaintiffs can easily avoid facing rule-of-reason review at summary judgment by concocting fact issues about a restraint’s ‘terms’: Even if the written agreement triggers the rule of reason . . . plaintiffs need only allege a ‘knowing nod and wink’ . . . that signaled different terms to force defendants into a costly trial or coerced settlement.”

Presumably there are evidentiary and Rule 11 requirements that preclude plaintiffs from “concocting” fact issues about a given restraint’s terms. And if the question were simply whether factual issues about whether the defendants entered into a naked market-allocation agreement precluded summary judgment, the opinion would not be remarkable. But the bigger problem with the Eighth Circuit’s decision is its broad language – e.g., “The district court erred by assuming that because the record did not establish an undisputed per se violation, then the rule of reason necessarily applied.” But if there is no per se violation, then what’s left is the Rule of Reason. By not allowing the district courts to resolve the standard of review question before trial, the Eighth Circuit leaves defendants wondering how they can prepare for a trial without knowing whether the per se rule or the Rule of Reason applies. Wholesale Grocery Products offers no guidance as to how defendants (and plaintiffs) should handle this dilemma.

(*) The Eighth Circuit seemed to think that a geographic market division – even one ancillary to a legitimate sale of assets – would be subject to the per se rule. This blanket conclusion seems questionable. Had the Eighth Circuit rejected the argument that an ancillary geographic division could be per se unlawful, its holding would have avoided the problems caused by deferring resolution of the question whether to apply the per se rule or the Rule of Reason.

Do State Bar Associations Have Antitrust Risk?

It was only a matter of time after the Supreme Court’s decision in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (*), that a state bar association would face an antitrust suit.  But the suit happened quickly: on June 3, LegalZoom sued the North Carolina State Bar for violations of Sherman Act Sections 1 and 2 in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina.  LegalZoom.Com, Inc. v. North Carolina State Bar, Case No. 1:15-CV-439 (M.D.N.C.).

In a nutshell, LegalZoom alleges that the Bar does not enjoy antitrust immunity because it is controlled by lawyers (market participants) and its activities are not actively supervised by the state.  LegalZoom challenges the Bar’s refusal to register its prepaid legal plans, which it sells in 42 states and the District of Columbia.  LegalZoom seeks not only injunctive relief, but also $3.5 million in damages (before statutory trebling).

This may be the leading edge of a wave of lawsuits challenging activities of state boards staffed by industry participants.

(*) I covered the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Dental Examiners here.

Can Trademark Abuse Constitute Monopolization?

English: Trademark

Trademark (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

As far as antitrust law is concerned, trademarks are the unwanted stepchildren of intellectual property. The conventional wisdom is that trademarks – whose exclusionary effect is very attenuated, if it exists at all – do not confer market power, so their use (or refusal to license) can’t support a Sherman Section 2 claim. But is there an argument against the conventional wisdom?

The answer may be: “yes, in unusual circumstances.”(*)

Fraudulently obtaining a trademark

Let’s start by considering other types of IP that present clearer issues.  When a patentee obtains a patent through fraud on the PTO, it engages in exclusionary conduct.  See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965).  Of course if the patentee never enforces his patent, there is likely no injury; the injury occurs when the patentee enforces or attempts to enforce a fraudulently-obtained patent.

Courts have extended the reasoning of Walker Process to the fraudulent procurement of copyrights.  See, e.g., Knickerbocker Toy Co. v. Winterbrook Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1309, 1321 (D.N.H. 1982).  See also Michael Anthony Jewelers v. Peacock Jewelry, Inc., 795 F. Supp. 639, 647-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (allegations of enforcement of fraudulently-obtained copyright and other conduct were sufficient to support a monopolization claim).

Fraudulent procurement of a trademark also might be exclusionary.  See, e.g., Northwestern Corp. v. Gabriel Mfg. Co., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19275 (N.D. Ill. 1996) at *19 (“Trademark monopolization or attempted monopolization claims often fall into one of two general categories.  The first involves the use of an illegally obtained trademark and focuses on the power of the trademarked product to monopolize a relevant economic market solely as a consequence of its illegal registration.”); Caplan v. Am. Baby, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 869, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (denying motion to dismiss attempted monopolization counterclaim challenging an attempt to register an unenforceable trademark and to enjoin others from its use despite its cancellation).  See also G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1436, 1473 (E.D. Wis. 1987) (test to be applied in determining whether a particular trademark constitutes a Section 2 violation is the same as in any other case where an unlawful monopoly or attempt to monopolize is alleged; Section 2 is violated only when the trademark owner’s “actions have led to or resulted in a dangerous probability that it will gain a monopoly over the relevant market”), aff’d, 873 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1989).

Note that fraud on the PTO is not itself actionable under the Sherman Act; a plaintiff must still plead and prove all the other elements of a Section 2 violation.  That is particularly true after Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42-43 (2006), where the Supreme Court held that even patents do not presumptively confer market power.  Plaintiffs therefore cannot rely on the existence of IP to establish market power.  Nor does fraud on the PTO itself establish antitrust injury (i.e., harm to competition).  Nevertheless, PTO fraud can constitute the core of a Section 2 claim.

Market power?

That leaves the question of whether trademarks can confer market power. As a general rule, “[b]ecause trademarks, unlike patents, do not confer exclusionary power over products or services, excluding others from the use of a trademark will not support an attempt to monopolize claim.”  II Antitrust Law Developments (7th ed. 2012) at 1131. Still, as one court wrote:

There is no controlling case law addressing whether the attempted enforcement of a trademark can constitute an antitrust violation, but there is persuasive precedent which indicates that if a plaintiff could demonstrate the other elements of a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, then the attempted enforcement of a trademark may constitute an antitrust violation. Specifically, Justice Blackmun noted in his concurring opinion in Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., that “the enforcement of restrictive provisions in a license to use . . . a trademark may violate the Sherman Act.”  Moreover, even the case upon which SnoWizard relies, Car-Freshner Corp. v. Auto Aid Mfg. Corp., states [“[t]here is no doubt that a trademark may be utilized in such a manner as to constitute a violation of antitrust laws,” and “trademark laws may not be used to monopolize with respect to a certain product.”  Although it is equally clear that the nature of a trademark, which does not in any way represent a monopoly conferred upon a particular product, will make it particularly difficult to establish that “the plaintiffs’ actions have led to or resulted in a dangerous probability that it will gain a monopoly over the product in issue.”  Nonetheless, such a claim is possible as a matter of law.

Southern Snow Mfg. Co. v. SnoWizard Holdings, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22157 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 2013) at *17-18 (footnotes omit.).

The question is whether a fraudulently-obtained trademark protects just the mark itself or some functional aspect of the product. (The PTO shouldn’t issue trademarks that cover the latter.) For example, in RJ Machine Co. v. Canada Pipeline Accessories Co., Case No. 1:13-cv-00579-SS (W.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2013), the court dismissed antitrust claims predicated upon alleged trademark misuse – but left the door open to future claims based on similar conduct.  RJ Machine Co. involved flow conditioners in oil pipelines. The defendant had a patent on a type of flow conditioner which expired in 2011. The defendant also obtained a trademark registration for the terms “50E” and “CPA-50E” for certain flow conditioners. Additionally, the defendant allegedly claimed the design of its 50E flow conditioner comprised non-functional, distinctive, and protectable trade dress.

The plaintiff (a potential market entrant) claimed that the defendant threatened to sue if the plaintiff advertised or marketed a flow conditioner using the design taught in the expired patent or used the term “50E” to identify its flow conditioner, and brought antitrust and other claims. The court dismissed the antitrust claims because the defendant was allegedly enforcing registered trademarks, and the exercise and enforcement of those marks could not be a “sham” or in “bad faith” under a Noerr-Pennington (petitioning immunity) type analysis.  However, the court did not entirely agree with the defendant that enforcement of trademarks and claimed trade dress can never be considered an antitrust injury because the plaintiff “in order to escape the clutches of an alleged trademark monopoly” can just market its product under a different name. The court noted that

RJ Machine contends the term “50E”, based on the history and development of the market for this product, is the only term consumers associate with this flow conditioner. In addition, according to RJ Machine’s allegations, Canada Pipeline has been able to “lock in” consumers of 50E conditioners because they can only be replaced by flow conditioners with the same 50E design. The anticompetitive argument is even more persuasive when it comes to trade dress. If the 50E design is as functional as RJ Machine alleges, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for RJ Machine to compete in the flow conditioner market without using the same functional design Canada Pipeline is claiming to be its trade dress.

Id. at 7.

See also General Physiotherapy, Inc. v. Sybaritic, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3796 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 1, 2006):

While the configurations of the massage head/applicators have always been represented to the public as functional, they were represented to the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) as non-functional.  Defendants also claim Muchisky provided other false and/or misleading information to the PTO.  This, Defendants contend, indicates the trademark registrations were issued by the PTO based on Muchisky’s fraud and that the trademark registrations are not, and were never, entitled to trademark protection.  Defendants argue this evidence, and the evidence of Muchisky’s bullying tactics and intent to monopolize the market, supports a finding that antitrust laws have been violated and creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding General and Muchisky’s claim that they acted in good faith in asserting trademark rights. This Court agrees.  General and Muchisky’s motion for summary judgment on this ground will be denied.

Id. at *12 (footnote omit). Consider also the scenario where a fraudulently-obtained trademark is actually an important search term on the Internet.

So – there might be circumstances where a fraudulently-obtained trademark could be used in a way that violates Section 2. But proving a Section 2 violation based on trademark abuse may in practice be difficult to do.

(*) These are just some thoughts. There are responses and rejoinders. My disclaimer is: feel free to read, but I’m not necessarily endorsing this train of thought.

Pay-for-delay and the Rule of Reason

Last week, I co-authored an article in the Los Angeles/San Francisco Daily Journal on the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in the Cipro Cases.  There, the Court held that so-called “reverse payment” patent settlements are evaluated under a specific “structured” Rule of Reason analysis, and rejected plaintiffs’ arguments that settlement payments exceeding the costs of litigation or the value of services provided by a generic manufacturer are per se unlawful.

The article is behind a pay wall.  When I get clearance to republish it, I will do so here.

* Updated 06/08/2015: The article is attached. * FNL-Orrick (DJ-5.14.15)

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