My latest piece on joint ventures — and the ancillary restraints doctrine — is available here.
I am pleased to announce that I will be speaking in an upcoming Strafford live webinar, “Antitrust Concerns With Joint Ventures and Other Collaborations: Balancing Competitive vs. Anti-Competitive Effects” scheduled for Thursday, August 24, 1:00 pm-2:30 pm EDT.
I’ve begun a new blog series on the antitrust analysis of joint ventures on the Orrick AntitrustWatch blog. Here’s a link to the second article. As I wrote there:
In this installment, we will unpack some of the major antitrust issues surrounding the threshold question of whether or not a JV is a legitimate collaboration. In particular, we will first try to separate the analyses of, on the one hand, JV formation, and on the other, JV operation and structure. Then we will consider whether a JV (i) constitutes a “naked” agreement between or among competitors which is per se unlawful, (ii) presents no significant antitrust issue because there is only a single, integrated entity performing the JV functions, or (iii) involves restraints within the scope of a legitimate collaboration that are virtually per se lawful.
I’ve begun a new blog series on the antitrust analysis of joint ventures on the Orrick AntitrustWatch blog. Here’s a link to the first article. As I wrote there:
Joint ventures (“JVs”) can require navigation of a potential minefield of antitrust issues, which we’ll explore in a series of six blog posts beginning with this introductory post. Not all of the law in this area is entirely settled, and there remain ongoing debates about some aspects of the antitrust treatment of JVs. Indeed, arriving at a coherent and unified view of JV law is like putting together a jigsaw puzzle with missing and damaged pieces.
The series is intended to explore how and why antitrust law applies to JVs, and how to structure JVs to avoid issues. Keep in mind that the term “JV” is flexible and reaches many types of activity that you might not otherwise think of as a JV. The term of course reaches traditional formal business collaborations between or among companies to produce or buy products or services. But the antitrust analysis of joint ventures also reaches, or can reach, trade associations, standard-setting bodies, patent pools, agreements to jointly market products, and even professional and amateur sports leagues.