Distribution, Competition, and Antitrust / Intellectual Property (IP) Law

Patent Exhaustion Doctrine Does Not Protect Farmers Who Replant Patented Seeds

In a brief, unanimous opinion written by Justice Kagan, the Supreme Court yesterday agreed with Monsanto that the patent exhaustion doctrine does not enable farmers to replant and reproduce patented seeds without the patentee’s permission. The Court emphasized the well-established rule that the doctrine restricts a patentee’s rights only as to the particular articles sold, and leaves untouched the patentee’s ability to prevent a buyer from making new copies of the patented item.

The Court did expressly note that its holding was limited – addressing the situation before it, rather than every one involving a self-replicating product. “In another case, the article’s self-replication might occur outside the purchaser’s control. Or it might be an incidental step in using the item for another purpose . . . . We need not address here whether or how the doctrine of patent exhaustion would apply in such circumstances.”

I covered the patent exhaustion doctrine previously – see, for example, here, here, and here.

The decision likely has implications in other industries. For example, BSA/The Software Alliance filed a brief arguing that a contrary decision might “facilitate software piracy on a broad scale” because software can be easily duplicated. However, it also noted that a decision that went too in favor of protecting patent rights might unduly encourage nuisance software patent infringement suits.

The opinion, styled Bowman v. Monsanto Co., No. 11-796 (May 13, 2013), is available here.

Should Antitrust Regulate Trolls?

Look at them, troll mother said. Look at my so...

(Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Professor Michael Carrier has written a recent op-ed over at arstechnica suggesting that the answer is “yes.”  Highlights:

“To start, [the antitrust agencies] can challenge concerning aggregations of patents . . . . [M]assive patent portfolios can be used offensively and can be valuable because of their size rather than the validity of each patent. These portfolios can have anticompetitive effects, including holdup, raised rivals’ costs, increased price, and reduced innovation.”

“The agencies could also promote transparency. Much troll activity today is hidden beneath a labyrinth of shell companies . . . .  Given this, how could potential targets engage in licensing negotiations or evaluate patent portfolios? The agencies must be able to shine sunlight on this subterranean network, obtaining complete information from patent acquisitions, among other conduct, to determine competitive effects.”

“It seems particularly slippery for trolls to avoid promises made by their predecessors. The agencies could prohibit transfers to trolls that refuse to adhere to promises to keep licensing costs reasonable.”

The article discusses other ideas as well, and also suggests that Section 5 of the FTC Act could be used where “certain trolls have market power in technology (licensing) markets, do not offer non-trivial efficiencies, and cause competitive harm that results in higher prices or reduced innovation for consumers.”

(Note: some people prefer the term “patent assertion entities,” or PAEs, over the term “trolls.”)

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Free Product Distribution or Discounted Component Distribution Likely Does Not Exhaust Patent Rights

OneTouch Ultra2 is being used by a diabetic pa...

OneTouch Ultra2 is being used by a diabetic patient. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

In LifeScan, Inc. v. Shasta Technologies, LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38677 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2013), Judge Davila granted plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction to address claims of patent infringement, and addressed whether patent exhaustion doctrine applies to free distribution of product or to discounted distribution of only one component of a product.

I previously covered patent exhaustion doctrine here.  In a nutshell, the patent monopoly is exhausted after a patentee sells the patented invention in whole, or under certain circumstances, in part. (A license to use technology in a certain field of use, however, generally does not trigger the exhaustion doctrine, also known as the first sale doctrine.)

In LifeScan, the plaintiff markets and sells the “OneTouch Ultra System,” a glucose monitoring system. The system is composed of both a meter and disposable test strips. A patent covering “DoubleSure Technology” specifies a method designed to improve the reliability and accuracy of glucose measurements. The technology uses a self-testing strip design using multiple sensors.

Defendants made strips for use in the OneTouch Ultra System (thus prompting the patent suit), and argued that LifeScan’s patent rights were exhausted for two reasons. The court rejected each argument.

First, LifeScan has doctors distribute free OneTouch Ultra kits, comprised of meters and test strips, to diabetic patients. The court held – at least at the preliminary injunction stage – that LifeScan could likely show that this free distribution did not exhaust its patent rights. LifeScan receives no remuneration at the moment it parts with the patented invention. The fact that LifeScan distributes the kits in consideration of patients’ anticipated future repeat purchases of disposable test strips was not enough. According to the court, the common theme running through prior case law – which did not squarely address the issue before the court – was that there must be consideration at the time of the authorized sale in order for the patent exhaustion doctrine to attach.

Second, LifeScan sells OneTouch Ultra meters alone at a reduced price. But this practice too, the court held, likely does not trigger patent exhaustion, because the patent at issue is a method patent that requires both a meter and a test strip for an individual to practice it. “As such, the sale of the meter by itself does not necessarily convey the entire invention of the . . . patent to the purchaser, casting the applicability of exhaustion into doubt.”

The decision reaches the appropriate result – patent rights should not be lost merely because of a novel distribution system, one that is likely pro-competitive because it fosters dissemination of new technology.

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Speaking on the Nine Potential Patent Licensing “No-Nos”

On March 13, 2013 at 1:00 p.m. Eastern Time, I’ll be speaking at a Licensing Executives Society webinar on the nine patent licensing no-nos.  You can find more information about the webinar here.

Readers of this blog will know that I recently wrote a series of posts on this topic.

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Can An “Anti-Patent Troll” Be a Monopsonist or a Section 1 Conspirator?

The official online color is: #A4C639 . 한국어: 공...

(Photo credit: Wikipedia)

A recent interesting case suggests that “anti-patent trolls” may in theory face antitrust liability. In Cascades Computer Innovation LLC v. RPX Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10526 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2013), Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers dismissed – with leave to amend – Cascades’ antitrust complaint against RPX, Dell, HTC, LG Electronics, Motorola Mobility, and Samsung.

Cascades is a non-practicing entity (“NPE”), accused by the defendants of being a “patent troll.” It holds the rights to a portfolio of patents relating to technology that optimizes the use of the Android mobile phone/tablet operating system. Dell, HTC, LG, Motorola Mobility, and Samsung (the manufacturing defendants) sell mobile devices, including those employing the Android operating system. Together, they allegedly sell more than 95% of all Android devices in the United States.

Cascades alleged that the manufacturing defendants, along with RPX, engaged in a group boycott to not license Cascades’ patents. RPX is a defensive patent aggregator – an “anti-troll” – formed to protect its members from NPEs. It frequently acts as an intermediary for its members for purposes of acquiring patents and negotiating licenses on behalf of its members.

In a nutshell, Cascades alleged that the manufacturing defendants, through or with RPX, refused to negotiate separately with Cascades for patent licenses, or at least refused to negotiate independently in a “serious” manner with Cascades, and that the defendants agreed not to license Cascades’ patents. Allegedly, the object of the conspiracy was to force Cascades to abandon its efforts to license and enforce its patents, accept a below market-value offer from RPX, or go out of business by virtue of expensive litigation. In this manner, defendants would allegedly obtain a monopsony position.

In granting defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint, the Northern District of California agreed that Cascades had not adequately alleged a conspiracy, had not properly defined a relevant market, and had not adequately alleged harm to competition.

The court also agreed that Cascades had not adequately pled a conspiracy that made economic sense. According to RPX, a more plausible explanation for the manufacturing defendants’ decision to decline a $5 million licensing offer was that the offer price was too high. RPX had been negotiating a $10 million deal for all of its 110 members, which made a $5 million offer to each of LG, Motorola, Samsung and HTC too high (collectively $20 million). Although the court did not endorse this and several other “economic sense” arguments, it concluded that Cascades

ha[d] fastidiously avoided providing specific facts with respect to the timing of the alleged negotiations and the interplay with the filing of [actions] for patent infringement. Cascades also will need to provide specific facts to clarify why, absent a conspiracy, it is economically irrational for the Manufacturing Defendants—who are being sued by Cascades for infringement of one patent, the ‘750 Patent—to decline an offer to license Cascades’ entire portfolio of 38 patents. Without clarification and specificity, the Court will not presume economic [ir]rationality where the circumstances giving rise to the lawsuit plausibly suggest nothing more than a tactical ploy to regain economic leverage that Plaintiff lost in the licensing negotiations.

However, the court also refused to hold that the alleged group boycott activity could not constitute a per se Section 1 violation. And the court rejected defendants’ argument that Cascades failed to allege antitrust injury because of the lack of allegations regarding possible consumer injury. “Anticompetitive conduct need not harm consumers specifically in order to cause antitrust injury.”

Although Cascades now has an uphill battle, given leave to amend the complaint, only time will tell whether it can allege sufficient facts to establish its conspiracy, competitive harm, and relevant market allegations.

As Professor Hovenkamp cogently wrote in a comment to the article below — a comment which still applies to the likely amended complaint:

As a matter of antitrust law, a great deal will depend on whether this is a naked agreement to refuse to license (or to suppress the price), or whether it is an ancillary agreement setting standards so as to exclude the plaintiff. A naked agreement among a group of competing manufacturers not to purchase a license or to pay only a low fee would be illegal per se under the antitrust laws. On the other hand, joint licensees who are actively engaged in standard setting do set standards that exclude some technologies. Standard setting is addressed under the rule of reason and generally upheld if there is an objectively reasonable basis for the exclusion. An objectively reasonable basis could include a decision that a patent offered by an outsider is not valid or that the manufactures already have suitable alternatives to the offered patent or are not infringing it.

Another possibility is that the defendant device manufacturers are not acting in concert at all, but are individually deciding not to purchase a license from the plaintiff. The firms are not monopolists, and in any event there is no law in the United States that requires even a monopolist (acting unilaterally) to purchase a license from an outside patentee.

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The Continuing Saga of Reverse Payment Patent Litigation

Lower generic drug costs

Lower generic drug costs (Photo credit: BC Gov Photos)

In FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Supreme Court No. 12-416), the FTC unsurprisingly filed a merits brief this month again arguing that pay-for-delay (or “reverse payment”) patent settlements are presumptively anti-competitive.

These settlements often occur in connection with the Hatch-Waxman Act and patent lawsuits filed by a patent-owning pharmaceutical manufacturer against a would-be generic manufacturer. Following a patent lawsuit, the branded manufacturer will pay the generic compensation in return for the generic’s agreement to stay off the market for some period of time.  According to the FTC:

Given the significant difference between monopoly and competitive drug prices, a brand-name manufacturer has a strong economic incentive to induce its would-be generic competitor to forgo competition. And while the generic manufacturer will profit if it prevails in paragraph IV [Hatch-Waxman] litigation and enters the market, its profits will be much less than the brand-name manufacturer stands to lose. As a result, both the brand-name and generic manufacturers may benefit (at the expense of consumers) if the brand-name manufacturer agrees to share its monopoly profits in exchange for the generic manufacturer’s agreement to defer its own entry into the market.

FTC brief at 8-9. The FTC’s position is contra that of the Eleventh Circuit and mostly in line with that of the Third Circuit, which in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012), held that reverse payment agreements are subject to a “quick look rule of reason analysis” under which “any payment from a patent holder to a generic patent challenger who agrees to delay entry into the market [is] prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade.” Id. at 218.

Oral argument is set for March 25.

I previously covered Watson and K-Dur.

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On the FTC-Google Settlement

Much has already been written about the specific terms of the settlement, so I will not attempt duplicate that effort. You can find the actual settlement here.  There is some interesting background /behind-the-scenes information on Google’s “antitrust escape” in this Wall Street Journal article.

In a nutshell, the settlement addressed three areas: (1) standard-essential patents (SEPs); (2) advertisers’ management of their ad campaigns; and (3) website “scraping.”

1. The settlement restricts Google (and its subsidiary, Motorola Mobility) from seeking injunctions on SEPs against potential licensees who are willing to enter into a license on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. As a result, Google is generally prohibited from seeking injunctions for FRAND-encumbered SEPs. Although Google is allowed to seek injunctions in certain narrow situations—e.g., when a potential licensee refuses to enter into a license agreement on FRAND terms and is an “unwilling” licensee —the settlement outlines specific procedures that Google must follow when negotiating with potential licensees for its SEPs.

Practical result: The settlement reinforces the general rule that SEP owners may not seek injunctions. It also makes clear that potential licensees should pay particular attention to notices of alleged SEP infringement, because failure to respond could be interpreted as being an unwilling licensee.  However, the settlement’s complex license negotiation procedures may encourage opportunistic efforts to portray companies as “unwilling” licensees who can be enjoined.

2. Google agreed to remove restrictions on the use of its online search advertising platform, AdWords, that may make it more difficult for advertisers to coordinate online advertising campaigns across multiple platforms.

Practical result: Some advertisers may have at least a marginally easier time pursuing their advertising goals on non-Google platforms thanks to this commitment. However, it is not clear how robust the effects of the commitment will be.

3. Google committed to refrain from “scraping” the content of certain competing websites, passing the content off as its own, and threatening to de-list rivals entirely from Google’s search results if and when they protest about the alleged misappropriation of content. Websites will now have the ability to “opt out” of display on Google “vertical” properties (websites that focus on specific categories such as shopping or travel).

Practical result: Unclear, although arguably at least somewhat pro-competitive by removing a possible obstruction to innovation on the Internet.

The elephant in the room, however, is that although the Commission did investigate the central issue for many observers – allegations of so-called search algorithm bias favoring Google properties over others – the Commission’s settlement does not address this issue. Instead, the FTC “concluded that the introduction of Universal Search, as well as additional changes made to Google’s search algorithms – even those that may have had the effect of harming individual competitors – could be plausibly justified as innovations that improved Google’s product and the experience of its users. It therefore has chosen to close the investigation.”

Many observers think that the FTC missed the boat on this one.

The European Commission is still investigating Google’s search practices, and it may not be deterred by the FTC’s decision. EU competition law is generally more protective of competitors’ interests than U.S. law, which tends to focus more narrowly on competition itself and on consumer welfare. 

Rivals — including Microsoft, which owns search engine bing — are also not terribly impressed with the settlement, see the report in the linked article below.  Whether competitors, advertisers, or consumer classes attempt to bring their own challenges to alleged Google search engine bias remains to be seen.

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Supreme Court Grants Cert in Watson Pay-For-Delay Case

On December 7, 2012, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals.  The Supreme Court is now poised to resolve the circuit split on the treatment of so-called “pay for delay” Hatch-Waxman Act patent litigation settlements.

The Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits have all allowed such settlements where they do not exceed the duration or scope of the patent (or involve sham litigation or fraudulently-obtained patents).  The Third Circuit has disagreed, finding that payments from patent-holding pharmaceutical manufacturers to generics to stay off the market are prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation.

You can find past blog entries on pay-for-delay issues and the Hatch-Waxman act by using the search feature.

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Direct Purchasers Can Bring Walker Process Claims

In Ritz Camera & Image v. SanDisk Corp., No. 2012-1183 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 20, 2012), the Federal Circuit held that direct purchasers have antitrust standing to bring Walker Process claims.

In a typical Walker Process claim, an alleged patent infringer claims that the patentee fraudulently obtained a patent or patents from the Patent and Trademark Office.  Usually the claim is brought as a type of monopolization claim.

In Ritz Camera, a direct purchaser of SanDisk products (not an alleged patent infringer) brought a Walker Process claim, alleging that by fraudulently obtaining patents, SanDisk was able to raise prices above competitive levels.  The Federal Circuit found that the plaintiff had antitrust standing.  “Ritz’s status as a direct purchaser gives it standing to pursue its Walker Process claim even if it could not have sought a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity or unenforceability.”

The ruling increases patentees’ potential exposure to antitrust claims arising out of patent prosecution and enforcement.

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The Case for Abolishing Patents?

Patented!!!

Patented!!! (Photo credit: @MSG)

This September 2012 paper issued under the auspices of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis argues that patents should be abolished.  While they may initially promote innovation, “entrenched players like intellectual property lawyers who make their living filing lawsuits and old, established corporations that want to keep new players out of their markets lobby to expand the breadth of patent rights. And as patent rights get stronger, they take a serious toll on the economy, including our ability to innovate.”   See this short article in the Atlantic Monthly about the Fed paper.

Of course, the debate over the actual utility of patents — particularly software patents — is not new.  See this recent New York Times article.  But while some reforms are undoubtedly needed, abolishing all patents — particularly when other countries continue to protect IP through patents — seems like it might be throwing the baby out with the bath water and might lead to non-optimal outcomes in the U.S.

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